Dans cet article, l'auteur procède à une analyse critique des implications de la décision de la Cour fédérale sur l'accès à la justice à la lumière du principe voulant que les tribunaux puissent accorder des dépens pour promouvoir l'accès à la justice et des défis uniques que doivent relever les Canadiens qui sont maltraités à l'étranger par le gouvernement canadien.

I. INTRODUCTION
A growing list of Canadian citizens have suffered egregious mistreatment abroad as a result of actions taken by Canadian officials in the name of national security. 1 Canadians mistreated abroad are especially vulnerable when it comes to access to justice, understood narrowly in terms of access to courts.
2 Constitutional litigation regarding mistreatment abroad raises some of the most serious human rights violations imaginable, and yet those bringing forward such litigation face enormous challenges. The individuals involved cannot do so in person, because one of the forms of mistreatment they frequently face is being prevented from returning to Canada. As a result, they must generally rely on counsel. However, they may not be able to pay for counsel because they may be detained and destitute, and they may have had their assets frozen on national security grounds. Moreover, where they have been detained abroad for long periods they may not be eligible for legal aid due to provincial residency requirements. It is hard to
II. ABDELRAZIK V CANADA
A. The Context
Abousfian Abdelrazik came to Canada from Sudan in 1990. In 1992, he was accorded refugee protection and subsequently obtained Canadian citizenship.
5
Although he has never been charged with a criminal offence, 6 he was suspected of associating with individuals allegedly connected with terrorism. The nature of these suspected associations is not entirely clear, though it should be noted that he voluntarily testified against one of these individuals at a trial in the United States. 7 What is clear is that security agencies in Canada and abroad acknowledge that they have no evidence that Abdelrazik poses a security threat. 8 Similarly, no evidence that he poses such a threat has ever been publically presented.
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In March 2003, Abdelrazik travelled from Canada to Sudan to visit his ailing mother.
10 During this visit he was detained and allegedly tortured by Sudanese authorities for a period of 11 months. 11 There is some evidence suggesting that his detention came at the request of the Canadian government. Although the government contests this evidence, a Canadian government memo obtained through access to information procedures states: "Sudanese authorities readily admit that they have no charges pending against him but are holding him at our request."
12 Moreover, the Canadian government concedes that during his detention Ibid at para 11. Ibid.
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he was interrogated by representatives of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service [CSIS] . 13 Sudanese authorities released Abdelrazik from detention in July 2004. Shortly thereafter he sought to return to Canada. However, commercial airlines refused to provide him with passage on the grounds that his name was included on a "no-fly list".
14 He also sought to return to Canada by alternative means, including on a jet used by Canadian officials visiting Sudan, as well as on a jet offered by the Sudanese government. Both possibilities failed to materialize, which Abdelrazik attributes to the Canadian government's refusal to assist with either plan. 15 In October 2005, Abdelrazik was summoned to a meeting with Sudanese authorities. On the advice of Canadian consular officials, he attended the meeting. At the meeting he was re-arrested and detained for a further 9 months without charge. He alleges that he was also tortured during this second period of detention. Abdelrazik was once again released in July 2006. 16 Immediately following his release, Abdelrazik was added to the UN Security Council Resolution 1267 list [Resolution 1267 list] , maintained by the UN AlQaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee.
17 His listing likely came at the request of the United States, which, days before his listing, accused him of being "a person posing a significant risk of committing acts of terrorism that threaten the security of U.S. nationals and the national security."
18 By virtue of being placed on the Resolution 1267 list, Abdelrazik's assets were frozen, and anyone who directly or indirectly provided him funds became vulnerable to prosecution under Canadian criminal law. 19 Moreover, under international law, his listing subjected him to a travel ban, which requires States to "[p]revent the entry into or transit through their territories of [listed] individuals." 20 In October 2007, Abdelrazik petitioned the Canadian government to intervene on his behalf with the UN committee responsible for maintaining the Resolution 1267 list, requesting that he be delisted. While the government transmitted Abdelrazik's request to the committee, that request was denied without reasons being offered.
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Notwithstanding Abdelrazik's inclusion on the Resolution 1267 list, he continued to seek to return to Canada. Because his passport expired while he was in detention, he required a new passport or emergency travel documents in order to return to Canada. Canadian officials repeatedly assured him that, in the event he secured passage to Canada, he would be provided the requisite documents.
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Ibid at para 22. See also ibid at para 24. Internal government communications, however, indicate that Canadian authorities intended to oppose his return to the country even if he secured a ticket.
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Abdelrazik remained stuck in Sudan. In April 2008, fearing that he would be rearrested because his case had attracted media attention, Abdelrazik sought and was granted temporary refuge in the Canadian embassy in Khartoum. Because he was destitute, the Canadian government provided him with a loan of $100.00 per month to cover his basic necessities while he remained in the embassy.
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In May 2008, having secured pro bono counsel in Canada, Abdelrazik sought a Federal Court order requiring the government to repatriate him "by any safe means at its disposal." 25 The order was requested on the grounds that it was necessary to remedy a breach of his right "to enter, remain in and leave Canada," as accorded to Canadian citizens by section 6 of the Charter. It quickly became apparent that the government intended to litigate the case. Abdelrazik's counsel sought an interim costs award to ensure that the case could be litigated. 26 In July 2008, the Federal Court denied the requested interim costs, 27 a decision subsequently upheld by the Federal Court of Appeal. 28 The Federal Court decision is the subject of this comment.
Faced with the Federal Court's denial of his motion for interim costs, Abdelrazik's counsel continued to represent him pro bono on the main application -and ultimately succeeded on this application.
With regard to this main application, the government had offered highly questionable arguments to justify their refusal to facilitate Abdelrazik's return to Canada. Specifically, the government asserted that the Charter right of citizens to enter and remain in Canada does not include a right of repatriation, because "the right to enter Canada does not create a right to be returned to Canada". 29 Alternatively, counsel for the government contended that even if there was a right to be repatriated, that right was not engaged in this case 30 because Abdelrazik was prevented from returning to Canada by his inclusion on the Resolution 1267 list and the accompanying travel ban under international law, not by the Canadian government.
31 While government counsel conceded that the travel ban contains an exemption for individuals returning to their country of nationality, 32 they argued that this exception merely "relieves states of the obligation to turn their own nationals away should they present themselves at the border." 33 The exception would not, this reasoning runs, allow Canada to participate in Abdelrazik's transit 23 Ibid at paras 32, 102-108,153 & 156. 24 Ibid at para 30.
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Ibid at paras 39-45. 32 Ibid at paras 46-54. 33 Ibid at para 51. through other states, including by flying through the airspace of other states. 34 As counsel for the government put it, "[t]he applicant's return to Canada is impeded because the necessary transit through the territories of other UN members is prohibited by virtue of his listing on the Resolution 1267 list."
35 The government's position was, thus, that to return to Canada, Abdelrazik first had to have his name removed from the Resolution 1267 list.
The government's arguments contradicted prevailing practices in other states, which frequently use the exemption to repatriate listed nationals notwithstanding that they must pass through the airspace of other states. 36 Similarly, a document prepared on behalf of the UN committee responsible for the Resolution 1267 list indicates that it is not even necessary for states to inform the committee when the exemption is exercised to allow individuals to transit through other states in order to return to their country of nationality.
37 Along similar lines, according to Richard Barrett, a UN administrator who oversaw the Resolution 1267 list, "[t]he overflight states don't come into it and they haven't ever come into it."
38 Although the Canadian government's central argument was, therefore, not especially compelling, government counsel nonetheless chose to continue litigating the main application.
Other developments in that litigation are particularly noteworthy because they suggest the extent to which Abdelrazik's return to Canada was frustrated by the Canadian government. In August 2008, Abdelrazik secured a reservation on a commercial airline to return to Canada. However, despite earlier assurances that he would be supplied emergency travel documents if he obtained a flight to Canada, the government declined to provide him with the necessary documents. Several months later, the government indicated that they were prepared to provide him with an emergency passport, but they imposed an additional requirement: not only must he obtain a ticket, but the ticket also had to be fully paid. 39 This additional requirement was followed by warnings that criminal charges under Canada's antiterrorist regulations could be laid against anyone who provided Abdelrazik funds to purchase such a ticket. 40 Despite the threat of criminal prosecution, in March 2009 over 100 individuals publically contributed small donations towards the purchase of a plane ticket for Abdelrazik to return to Canada. 41 As a result, he
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Ibid at para 41. 54 his assets were frozen, he was unable to leave the Canadian embassy for fear of being detained and tortured, he was subsisting on a $100.00 per month loan from the Canadian government, and those who might otherwise assist him financially appeared to be prohibited from doing so under Canada's anti-terrorism regulations. To fund the litigation, efforts were made to secure legal aid on Abdelrazik's behalf. However, having been detained in Sudan for several years, he was no Network <http://www.peoplescommission.org/en/abdelrazik/supporters.php>. Disclosure: the author is among the donors.
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Ibid at paras 154-155. 50 Ibid at para 153. longer considered a resident of a Canadian province, and therefore he was not eligible for provincial legal aid funding. 55 Not only was Abdelrazik destitute and ineligible for legal aid, but his pro bono counsel was also unable to commit in advance to assisting him for the duration of the litigation. Counsel swore an affidavit contending that he could not maintain the expense of carrying the case pro bono without personal hardship, concluding that the litigation would not be able to proceed on a pro bono basis. held that Abdelrazik's circumstances did not meet the conditions of the three-part test for granting interim costs, namely that: (1) the party seeking interim costs cannot afford to finance the litigation and that there is no other way for the litigation to proceed; (2) the claim is prima facie well founded; and (3) the claim raises issues of public importance. 59 In particular, Mactavish J held that Ablerazik failed to meet the first part of the test because, while she accepted that Abdelrazik was impecunious, 60 she found that there were two alternative means whereby the litigation could continue.
61
The first alternative identified was that counsel could continue to provide pro bono services.
62 Specifically, Mactavish J. found:
While Mr. Hameed does assert that the ongoing expense of continuing to represent Mr. Abdelrazik will cause him personal hardship, and that he does not believe that the litigation will be able to proceed on the pro bono basis which has brought it to this point, based upon the statements in his affidavit quoted above, it is not at all clear from the record that either Mr. Hameed or his associates will indeed be forced to withdraw from the file if the motion is denied.
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In other words, Mactavish J. required something more definitive than the belief expressed by counsel that the file could not continue to proceed on a pro bono basis. Absent "clear" evidence to this effect, Mactavish J. found that Abdelrazik should attempt to continue pursuing the main application with pro bono representation. Ibid at para 36.
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The second alternative identified by Mactavish J. was for Abdelrazik to fund the litigation privately, with the assistance of "family and friends in Canada". 64 She noted that Canada's anti-terrorism regulations impose criminal penalties on those who provide funds to individuals included on the Resolution 1267 list. 65 However, she also noted that according to government counsel it was, in principle, possible to apply for an exemption from these criminal penalties where funds are provided to cover the basic expenses of a listed person, which might arguably include legal expenses. 66 In evaluating Abdelrazik's likelihood of successfully obtaining this exemption, Mactavish J. acknowledged that the provisions setting out this exemption are unclear, and that there was no case law offering guidance regarding how to interpret them. 67 She nonetheless found that Abdelrazik should attempt to secure such an exemption prior to seeking interim costs, because there is "at least a chance that [he] may be able to obtain an exemption… so as to allow his supporters to assist him with his legal expenses."
68 Still, given the lack of clarity, Mactavish J. declined "to offer an opinion at this point on the proper interpretation of the Regulations."
69
Based on her finding that there might be alternative means to fund the litigation Mactavish J. held that Abdelrazik failed to meet the first part of the Okanagan test. She therefore refused Abdelrazik's application for interim costs without examining the remaining parts of the test.
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She did, however, go on to note that if Abdelrazik's circumstances changed or if a request for an exemption from Canada's anti-terrorist regulations was denied, he would be free to make a new motion for interim costs. 
Interim Costs in Individual Human Rights Litigation
The most straightforward implication of Abelrazik's experience lies in Mactavish J.'s restrictive approach to interim costs. While it is now uncontroversial that costs awards can be used to enhance access to justice, 73 interim costs awards used to this end remain nonetheless highly exceptional, largely because they require a party to fund an opponent's legal expenses while the litigation is still ongoing. In other words, not only must the party fund both sides of the litigation, but they must do so even though the merits of the case have yet to 64 Ibid at para 43. be determined and thus the allegations and arguments that are relied upon to justify the interim costs award have not yet been tested.
The common law test for when interim costs will be awarded reflects their exceptional nature. The Supreme Court held in Okanagan that interim costs are only appropriate where a prima facie meritorious claim which raises novel issues of public importance would otherwise be unable to proceed because of financial barriers.
74 Little Sisters No. 2 raised the threshold for awarding interim costs even further. 75 According to the majority, interim costs may be awarded only where the court would otherwise be participating in an injustice against the individual litigant and the public more generally. 76 In the majority's view, this restriction -which effectively places a heavy burden on the applicant to show that an interim costs award is the only way litigation of exceptional public importance can proceed 77 -was necessary in order to prevent interim costs from becoming a form of judicially imposed legal aid. 78 The restricted approach in Little Sisters No. 2 has drawn criticism from some commentators who saw potential in Okanagan for courts to respond to intractable problems of access to justice through interim costs awards. For example, Faisal Bhabha argues that, "[i]n light of Little Sisters No. 2, we can expect to see an even greater reluctance on the part of litigants and courts to rely on advance costs." 79 Mactavish J.'s decision to deny Abdelrazik interim costs offers a further example of judicial reluctance in this area. Abdelrazik was legally unable to work or receive funds. Canadian government action contributed to his risk of torture abroad and his attempts to return to Canada were repeatedly thwarted by the Canadian government using questionable methods and arguments. If someone in Abdelrazik's extreme circumstances is ineligible for interim costs, given the significance of his case for individual rights and the public more generally, then it is difficult to imagine how litigants asserting government violations of their individual human rights could ever qualify.
It should be acknowledged that Mactavish J.'s decision to deny interim costs in this case rested upon her factual finding that Abdelrazik had not fully explored all possible avenues for pursuing the litigation. Moreover, she explicitly invited Abdelrazik to bring a new motion for interim costs in the event that these avenues were fully exhausted. And indeed, he was never in a position to do so because his pro bono counsel persisted in representing him despite their earlier indication that this may not be possible.
Because he was not, in the end, prevented from fully pursuing his litigation, it would seem at first glance that Mactavish J. was correct in her view that declining to award interim costs would not lead the court to participate in an injusticewhich, as we have seen, is the threshold established in Little Sisters No. 2 for when interim costs are appropriate. However, in assessing Mactavish J.'s decision it is essential to keep in mind the unusual circumstances Abdelrazik faced. Unlike most 74 Okanagan, supra note 57 at para 40.
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Ibid at para 5. litigants, he was physically unable to access the courts without legal representation because he was (unconstitutionally) confined in the Canadian embassy in Khartoum. At the same time, also because of his confinement, communication with the outside world was difficult. In this context, expecting Abdelrazik to fully pursue the option of funding the litigation through private charity seems problematic. How was he supposed to seek an exemption from Canada's antiterrorist regulations, and then, if successful, organize private donations, when all the while he was confined to the embassy in Khartoum? Surely such arrangements would have had to be made by his pro bono lawyers on his behalf. In other words, in finding that Abdelrazik must take further steps to fully exhaust the option of financing his litigation through private charity, Mactavish J. seems to have assumed that he would continue to receive pro bono representation, even if only to arrange for the exemption and organize the donations.
Mactavish J.'s parallel holding that Abdelrazik failed to fully exhaust the option of litigating the main application by relying on pro bono representation was also problematic, even though the litigation did end up proceeding on this basis. There are three main difficulties with this aspect of the decision. First, Mactavish J. failed to discuss what Abdelrazik was supposed to do in the event that pro bono counsel withdrew due to financial constraints. Though Mactavish J. left open the possibility that in such circumstances Abdelrazik could bring a new motion for interim costs, she neglected to indicate how he could do so without counsel while he was effectively confined in an embassy abroad. Happily for Abdelrazik, such a new motion was not necessary. Nonetheless, given uncontested evidence that counsel re-evaluated on a monthly basis whether they could continue to provide pro bono services, this was a possibility that should have been addressed. Second, Mactavish J.'s decision places pro bono counsel in a difficult position. Recall that Mactavish J. found that Abdelrazik was not entitled to interim costs in part because it was not "clear" that his pro bono counsel would be forced to withdraw, despite sworn affidavit evidence indicating that counsel did not believe they could continue providing pro bono services due to financial constraints. While Mactavish J. did not specify exactly what would constitute "clear" evidence to this effect, it seems likely that a commitment to withdraw if interim costs are denied would be necessary. As one of Abdelrazik's pro bono counsel, Amir Attaran, describes it, this "is essentially to say that counsel has to blackmail the court into awarding advance costs." 80 Moreover, it should be remembered that in order to succeed in this "blackmail", pro bono counsel must simultaneously show that the case is of such exceptional public importance that the court would be involved in an injustice if the case were not litigated. In other words, to obtain interim costs, pro bono counsel must (1) commit to withdrawing if interim costs are denied, in cases where (2) the failure to litigate the case because legal representation was unavailable would represent an injustice. That is to say, pro bono counsel must commit to participate in the very injustice that they are asking the court to prevent, and they may then be rewarded for that commitment by having the court order an opposing party to pay their fees. It should also be noted that, due to the complexity of motions for interim costs, it would be difficult for most individuals challenging alleged human rights abuses abroad -even if they are not confined in an embassy -to bring forward such motions without the assistance of pro bono counsel. In practice, then, it seems unlikely that motions for interim costs will typically come before the courts except through the efforts of pro bono counsel, who must then adopt this problematic position to succeed on the motion.
Third, the reasoning behind Mactavish J.'s finding that there was insufficient evidence that the litigation could not proceed on a pro bono basis may pose significant challenges for many other individual human rights litigants seeking interim costs. It is useful, in this respect, to compare typical individual human rights cases with both aboriginal rights and group rights litigation, areas in which interim costs requests have met with some degree of success.
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There are significant differences between individual human rights litigation and aboriginal rights litigation. For example, aboriginal rights litigation generally involves disputes between two or more communities, yet the adjudicative institutions in which the disputes are to be resolved have been designed by and are largely controlled by one of the communities, which raises obvious procedural fairness challenges.
82 Aboriginal rights litigation also frequently engages the honour of the Crown and always raises a long history of colonialism. 83 Given these challenges, Canadian courts characterize aboriginal rights litigation as sui generis, and often modify procedural rules in an attempt to accommodate the unique circumstances of such litigation.
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On a more day to day level, one further difference is that individual human rights litigation is usually less costly and less drawn out than aboriginal rights litigation. There are of course exceptions, but it is telling that Abdelrazik's main application was fully litigated within a little over a year, whereas the issues at the heart of the litigation that prompted the Okanagan decision in 2003 remain largely unresolved at the time of writing. Similarly, counsel for Abdelrazik estimated the value of their pro bono services at approximately $130,000, 85 whereas, in Okanagan, the aboriginal community estimated the costs of a full trial at around $814,000.
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There are also important differences between individual human rights litigation and group rights litigation. Consider for example, the recent decision, R v Caron, where the Supreme Court upheld an interim costs award in the context of constitutional minority language rights litigation. In that case, Caron, a FrancoAlbertan, sought to challenge the constitutional validity of English-only traffic ticket proceedings on the basis of a conflict with language rights purportedly accorded through the Royal Proclamation of 1869. Caron initially funded the litigation through private loans and donations, and through the now-defunct Court Challenges Program. However, as the length of the trial increased and as the voluminous historical evidence submitted by the Crown accumulated, he quickly exhausted his funds and was unable to secure further funding. He therefore applied for -and obtained -an interim costs award.
88
In upholding the interim costs award, the Supreme Court noted that the litigant's resources were exhausted largely due to the substantial historical record filed by the Crown and the large number of expert witnesses, and that as a result, Caron could not proceed with the litigation without an interim costs award. 89 Moreover, the Court found that Caron had demonstrated at least a prima facie case. 90 Finally, the Court found that the case was of exceptional public importance because it questioned the validity of all of Alberta's unilingual statutes: "The injury created by continuing uncertainty about French language rights in Alberta transcends Mr. Caron's particular situation and risks injury to the broader Alberta public interest."
91 As a result, the Supreme Court held that Caron met the test for interim costs as established by Okanagan and Little Sisters No. 2. It would seem, then, that part of the reason that interim costs were awarded in this case is that, as with aboriginal rights litigation, minority language rights litigation often involves voluminous historical records and entails disputes between communities that have widespread effects beyond the individual litigants involved.
Interim costs decisions in aboriginal and group rights litigation are likely often affected by factors such as voluminous records in cross-community disputes, which may partly explain why interim costs awards appear more common in such cases than in individual human rights litigation. Moreover, the fact that individual human rights litigation is often less costly and drawn out than aboriginal and group rights litigation likely means that arguments about the unavailability of pro bono representation in individual human rights litigation will be more difficult to substantiate. This seems particularly likely where the individual human rights violation at stake attracts media attention and raises novel legal issues, thereby making pro bono representation attractive to counsel. One would expect that these factors will often be present in human rights cases that meet the other conditions for interim costs awards (i.e. prima facie meritorious cases of exceptional public importance). While aboriginal and group rights litigation may also be attractive to pro bono counsel for similar reasons, the expense -both in terms of hours and disbursements -associated with litigating such cases make pro bono representation in these circumstances more onerous.
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It therefore appears likely that Mactavish J's strict application of the first branch of the Okanagan test to evaluate the viability of pro bono representation as an alternative to interim costs will be applicable to many cases involving human rights litigation, particularly outside the context of aboriginal and group rights. It would seem, then, that for those who hoped that Okanagan offered a means of funding prima facie meritorious human rights litigation of exceptional public importance brought by impecunious individuals, Abdelrazik's experience indicates that pro bono counsel arguing in favour of interim costs for their clients will face an uphill battle -and they may be forced into uncomfortable positions in that battle.
It must be emphasized that Abdelrazik was in an unusual situation. He was reliant on counsel to challenge his unlawful exile and confinement in an embassy abroad (i.e. he could not access the courts in person because of the very actions of the Canadian government that he sought to challenge). He was subject to antiterrorist regulations that at least arguably prohibited others from paying for counsel, and at any rate he did not have any means to organize private charity except through the services of pro bono counsel. Although he obtained pro bono counsel, they indicated that they may not be able to complete the litigation due to financial considerations, and if they did withdraw he would have no way to act on his own behalf, even for the limited purposes of seeking a new interim costs award. If Abdelrazik was not eligible for interim costs in these circumstances, then it is hard to imagine what individual human rights litigant would be -especially seeing as how motions for interim costs are unlikely to come before the courts except through the assistance of pro bono counsel.
Interim Costs in Section 6 Litigation
In addition to exemplifying a restrictive approach to interim costs in individual human rights litigation, and beyond its challenging implications for pro bono counsel, Abdelrazik's experience has important repercussions for litigation involving citizens who allege that their rights under section 6 of the Charter have been violated. This provision, which essentially prohibits exile, is among the most fundamental rights enjoyed by citizens.
92 Indeed, the drafters of the Charter found it prudent to allow the use of the section 33 notwithstanding clause to lawfully abridge most individual rights, including the section 7 right not to be deprived of life, liberty and security of the person except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. The section 6 right to enter and remain in Canada, in contrast, is among the limited set of rights that are so fundamental that they cannot lawfully be abridged in this manner. Because of the fundamental importance of section 6 rights, credible allegations regarding violations of the right to be free from exile should attract robust procedural protections. In assessing whether Abdelrazik should have been entitled to interim costs, the necessity of robust procedural protections where the right to be free from exile is at stake should have played a central role.
It should be recalled that the government's central argument in Abdelrazik's main application was that Canada could not provide him with the travel documents The 1267 Committee regime is… a situation for a listed person not unlike that of Josef K. in Kafka's The Trial, who awakens one morning, and for reasons never revealed to him or the reader, is arrested and prosecuted for an unspecified crime.
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Not only was the particular mechanism the government used to justify refusing to allow Abdelrazik's return to Canada procedurally problematic, but Abdelrazik's case was also part of a troubling global trend whereby states seek to limit procedural protections in national security investigations and enforcement.
99
Canada is a party to this trend. Consider, for instance, that wherever possible the Canadian government prefers to deal with individuals who are suspected of posing national security threats by deploying immigration procedures rather than criminal law procedures. 100 The reason for this preference is that immigration processes involve less robust procedural protections than criminal law procedures. example, non-citizens can be detained and deported if there are "reasonable grounds to believe" that they have been, are, or may be in the future, members of terrorist organizations. 102 To secure criminal convictions, however, more than mere membership is needed and the standard of proof is much more demanding -not reasonable grounds to believe, but beyond a reasonable doubt. 103 Departures from standard human rights and due process norms by the Canadian government in dealing with perceived national security threats are, of course, not limited to the context of non-citizens. 104 However, outside the immigration setting, the Charter imposes more significant restrictions. One way the Canadian government has tried to circumvent these restrictions is by relocating national security investigation and enforcement abroad in order to take advantage of the historical reluctance of courts to give extra-territorial application to Charter norms. 105 This is particularly evident in several recent cases where Canadian officials participated in the detention and interrogation abroad of Canadian citizens suspected of having ties to terrorism. In many such cases, the citizens in question allege that their detention and interrogation abroad involved mistreatmentincluding torture -that would, if committed in Canada, violate Charter norms. 106 The most familiar example involves Maher Arar, a Canadian citizen who was tortured in Syria after he was subjected to extraordinary rendition while on a stopover at an airport in the United States. A public inquiry into his case determined that one of the reasons for his extraordinary rendition was information provided by Canadian authorities to United States officials indicating, erroneously, that he was associated with terrorists. 107 The same public inquiry, after examining other cases of Canadian citizens detained abroad, concluded that "there appears to have been a pattern of investigative practices whereby Canadian agencies interacted with foreign agencies in respect of Canadians held abroad in connection with suspected terrorist activities."
108
One of the problematic features of Mactavish J.'s decision on Abdelrazik's application for interim costs is that the decision was inattentive to this context. In fact, Mactavish J. struck evidence of this context from the court record. Specifically, she struck evidence of a larger pattern of human rights violations against Canadian citizens abroad in the name of Canadian national security on the grounds that it was "irrelevant".
109 It is, however, hard to understand why a pattern whereby Canadian authorities abroad violated other Canadian citizens' rights would not be a relevant consideration in determining whether Abdelrazik's allegations were likely to be prima facie meritorious, as well as in determining whether exceptional circumstances existed that would justify an interim costs award.
Had Mactavish J. been more attentive to this context, she may have been less willing to apply a strict test for interim costs.
110 Indeed, had the context played a more prominent role in her reasoning, she may have explicitly considered whether the test for interim costs needed to be modified in light of: (1) the importance of the fundamental right of citizens to be free from exile and the need for robust procedural protections when that right is at risk; (2) the serious procedural defects in the 1267 Resolution list mechanism on which the government relied to justify its refusal to allow Abdelrazik to return home; and, (3) the experience of several other Canadian citizens abroad whose rights were violated by the Canadian government in the name of national security. All these factors made it exceptionally important that Abdelrazik be represented by competent counsel.
One way that Mactavish J. might have considered modifying the test for interim costs in light of these circumstances would have been to draw upon jurisprudence relating to section 7 of the Charter, which provides, "Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice."
111 In New
Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v G. (J.),
112 the Supreme Court held that courts may order state-funded legal representation to guarantee the fairness of litigation implicating a person's right to life, liberty or security of the person. To put this same point in slightly different terms, courts may order statefunded legal representation where such representation is necessary to ensure that a person's section 7 rights are not breached in a manner that fails to comply with the principles of fundamental justice. Expanding upon when courts should exercise their discretion to order state-funded legal representation in such circumstances, the Court indicated that the relevant factors include: "the seriousness of the interests at stake, the complexity of the proceedings and the capacity of the [litigant] ." underlying litigation involved a custody dispute, and the litigant had, in fact, been represented on a pro bono basis at the custody hearing by the time the separate issue of state-funded legal representation reached the Supreme Court. Because the individual received pro bono representation at the custody hearing -and therefore presumably enjoyed a fair procedure that complied with section 7 of the Charterthe matter of state-funded legal representation was technically moot. 114 The Court nonetheless agreed to decide the matter because the case raised the question of whether parents have a constitutional right to state-funded legal representation in custody hearings and this question was "undoubtedly of national importance." 115 Moreover, the Court noted that the only way it was likely to ever be in a position to decide this issue of national importance was by considering a moot case, because complex constitutional issues of this kind generally require the assistance of (pro bono) counsel in order to even come before the courts.
116
Significantly, this decision reveals that in cases implicating a person's right to life, liberty and security of the person, courts may be willing to consider the systemic issue of whether state-funded legal representation is constitutionally required for a particular subset of litigants, even if the individual who requests the state-funded legal representation actually obtained pro bono representation. Courts will doubtless be cautious in making such findings, because these findings appear to be a form of judicially imposed legal aid. But, in exceptional circumstances, courts may be willing to establish constitutionally mandated statefunded legal representation for particular subsets of litigants who have serious section 7 rights at stake in complex proceedings that they lack the capacity to navigate alone.
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In Abdelrazik's case, Mactavish J. explicitly noted that counsel did not present detailed arguments about this line of jurisprudence.
118 This omission arose largely because such jurisprudence is grounded in the language of "fundamental justice" from section 7 of the Charter, whereas Abdelrazik's counsel pursued the main litigation on the basis of the violation of Abdelrazik's right to return to Canada as protected by section 6 of the Charter. Though Abdelrazik's section 7 rights to life, liberty and security of the person were surely engaged, the legal tests for when a deprivation of life, liberty or security of the person abroad will be attributed to the Canadian government for the purposes of section 7 are complex and constantly evolving.
119 It was a more straightforward matter to show that Abdelrazik's section 6 rights had been breached by the Canadian government, given that the Canadian government's refusal to issue him travel documents prevented him from returning to Canada. 120 In this context, counsel's strategy of focusing on section 6 in the main application seems to have been prudent, as was ultimately confirmed when Abdelrazik succeeded on this basis in the main application. Moreover, this strategy was also in keeping with the holding in Little Sisters No. 2, where the majority held that cases must be framed as narrowly as possible so as to minimize their expense where interim costs are sought.
121 While the jurisprudence on state-funded legal representation in section 7 cases was not, as a result, put to Mactavish J. in detail, it is worth considering whether the reasoning from G. (J.) might nonetheless have been applicable to Abdelrazik's circumstances, even though the main litigation involved section 6 rights. For example, counsel for Abdelrazik might have reasonably contended that the violation of Abdelrazik's right to be free from exile, protected by section 6, also implicitly engaged his section 7 rights, including the right to both liberty and security of the person. As a result, while Abdelrazik's main litigation proceeded on the basis of the alleged violation of section 6, jurisprudence relating to state-funded legal representation in section 7 cases may still have been applicable. Alternatively, counsel for Abdelrazik could have suggested that the reasoning behind G. (J.) should be extended beyond section 7 cases to violations of other fundamental Charter rights, including the right to be free from exile.
Regardless of the particular path chosen to justify applying the G. (J.) test, if the test had been applied, Abdelrazik may have been eligible for state-funded legal representation. Recall that the test considers: (1) the importance of the interests affected by the litigation; (2) the complexity of the proceedings; and, (3) the capacity of the individual involved. With respect to the first part of the test, it seems evident that the alleged violation of Abdelrazik's fundamental right to be free from exile was serious and engaged important interests. The second part of the test would also have posed no problem, as the litigation involved complex constitutional legal questions, hotly contested factual allegations involving national security agencies, and the disturbing irregularities of the Resolution 1267 list procedures. Finally, with regard to the third part of the test, Abdelrazik's capacity to self-represent was severely compromised by his confinement in an embassy abroad.
Of course, given the oft-repeated concerns about courts refraining from mandating judicially imposed legal aid schemes, 122 himself, after all his case was ultimately fully litigated on a pro bono basis. Rather, what is troubling is the effect the decision may have on the ability of other Canadian citizens to challenge the violation of their right to be free from exile, especially where national security matters are at play. Had Mactavish J. ordered state-funded legal representation in this case, these other Canadians would have had an easier time securing counsel to challenge alleged human rights violations. Like in G. (J.) , this would have put the court in the difficult position of effectively establishing judicially imposed legal aid, albeit in a highly constrained subset of cases. However, in light of the larger context whereby the Canadian government has evidently sought to escape court oversight and constitutional restraints in national security investigation and enforcement activities by relocating those activities abroad, providing those most deeply affected by these activities with the right to state-funded legal representation would seem warranted.
In future litigation involving the section 6 rights of Canadians mistreated abroad, the possibility of securing state-funded legal representation on this basis should be explored further, particularly since Abdelrazik's experience appears to indicate that obtaining state-funded legal representation in these cases through interim costs awards is unlikely.
Pro Bono, Ex Post Costs & Contingency Fees
Although there may be avenues for securing access to justice for Canadians mistreated abroad by attempting to work with the existing tests for interim costs and both sections 6 and 7 of the Charter, considering the reluctance the courts have shown in this area, other options should also be explored. Moreover, given that publically funded legal representation for civil litigation more generally is extremely limited, 123 and in some cases has been entirely eliminated, 124 options other than publically funded legal representation need to be considered. Perhaps the most likely alternative is what ended up being employed by Abdelrazik -pro bono representation combined with costs awards at the conclusion of the litigation.
Recall that, despite personal hardship, Abdelrazik's counsel continued representing him on a pro bono basis. Moreover, Abdelrazik was successful on his main application, in that the Justice Zinn found that his section 6 rights had been breached and issued an order requiring the government to return him to Canada.
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Shortly after issuing this decision, Justice Zinn ordered the government to pay $47,500 in costs to Abdelrazik's pro bono counsel. 126 This amount represented more than standard party-party costs typically awarded in Federal Court, but less than the $127,600 in solicitor-client costs sought by pro bono counsel. 127 In making this costs award, Justice Zinn noted, "Counsel in this instance, taking on Mr. Abdelrazik's case in circumstances where he was unable to do so personally and was impecunious, conducted themselves in the best tradition of the Bar." 128 Thus, although the court was unwilling to award interim costs in advance of the determination on the merits, the court nonetheless awarded costs to Abdelrazik's pro bono counsel when the litigation proved successful. This is in keeping with recent case law establishing that pro bono counsel may be entitled to compensation through ex post costs awards. 129 To be sure, such costs awards do not usually fully compensate pro bono counsel for their time because full solicitorclient costs awards are rare. 130 Moreover, these awards operate in a similar manner as contingency fee arrangements -awards will typically only be available where pro bono counsel succeeded on the merits. Nonetheless, such awards may make it easier for some impecunious litigants -including perhaps some Canadian citizens mistreated abroad -to obtain counsel because the possibility of a costs award may mitigate some of the hardship for pro bono counsel in terms of lost fees and out of pocket disbursements.
In addition to the possibility of obtaining costs awards at the completion of litigation, contingency fee arrangements may be used to fund litigation in cases where compensation may eventually be sought for the mistreatment Canadian citizens suffer abroad at the hands of Canadian officials. Now that Abdelrazik is back in Canada, he has sued the government for over $24 million and the Minister of Foreign affairs in his personal capacity for $2 million. 131 The pro bono counsel who assisted Abdelrazik with his application to return to Canada also represent him in the lawsuit for compensation. Because the requested compensation is substantial, this type of case is amenable to contingency fee arrangements. It is, therefore, possible to imagine in these sorts of cases contingency fee arrangements entered into at the outset, where counsel agrees to represent Canadians mistreated abroad in their constitutional litigation on a pro bono basis with the stipulation that they will be entitled to any applicable costs award in that litigation, and that any subsequent suits involving damages will be handled on a contingency fee basis. Such a scenario could provide counsel with a financial incentive (or less of a financial disincentive) to take at least certain types of well-founded cases.
Of course, there are several limitations to funding individual human rights litigation through pro bono representation with the possibility of ex post costs awards and contingency fees in subsequent litigation regarding compensation. For example, individuals who are unpopular or unsympathetic may find it difficult to secure representation. Similarly, cases that appear likely to be drawn out and expensive may be less likely to attract pro bono counsel on these terms. Moreover, cases where compensation for individual human rights violations is unlikely may also prove less attractive to counsel. Still, considering the narrow approach to interim costs adopted by courts as reflected in Abdelrazik's experience, as well as other restrictions on publically funded legal services, lawyers acting in the "best tradition of the bar" by providing pro bono services may be the only viable route through which Canadians mistreated abroad in the name of national security can proceed with litigation. Perhaps for some of these pro bono counsel, the possibility of being compensated for at least part of their time through ex post costs awards, as well as the possibility of contingency fees in subsequent litigation may help to make their provision of pro bono services financially viable. In other words, if access to justice for individuals mistreated overseas depends on the ability of litigants to find lawyers willing to bear the financial burden of the litigation, measures such as ex post costs and contingency fees may make it easier to obtain access to justice. I hasten to add, however, that this is a highly restrictive approach to providing access to justice for Canadians mistreated abroad, one that is not especially sensitive to the serious nature of the violations at stake or the merits of the underlying claims.
III. CONCLUSION
Abdelrazik's experience raises challenging questions about access to justice in human rights litigation involving Canadian citizens mistreated abroad. Indeed, his experience shows the importance of competent legal representation when one's government breaches one's fundamental human rights abroad in the name of national security. Abdelrazik remains, at the time of writing, subject to serious national security restrictions and he has not yet received any compensation for the breach of his constitutional rights. Although, through the efforts of his pro bono counsel, he ultimately won his Charter litigation, resulting in his repatriation, his experience nonetheless holds troubling implications for the availability of interim costs awards in future individual human rights litigation and for pro bono counsel applying for such awards. In addition, his experience demonstrates the need for new approaches to requests for state-funded legal representation for Canadian citizens who are denied the right to return to Canada in contexts where national security issues are at play. It also highlights the continued importance of pro bono services, as well as the significance of ex post costs awards where individual human rights litigants are represented on a pro bono basis. Ontario (Toronto: Canadian Bar Association, 1988) .
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